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DUTCH DIKE BREACH, WILNIS 2003
S. Van Baars
University of Technology Delft
Delft, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT
In August 2003, after a very dry and warm summer, one of the dikes along a canal in The Netherlands failed at night.
Because of this dike breach, the water in the canal started to run into a housing quarter of the village Wilnis, which is
about 30 km Southeast of Amsterdam. A local contractor immediately started to close off the canal. By the time this
was finished, 600 houses were already half a meter under water. The 2000 residents were evacuated in the early
morning. Almost all residents could return to their homes the same evening after the water was pumped out of this area.
Like many other small dikes in The Netherlands, the complete dike consists of peat. Since peat has a relatively low
specific weight, a peat dike has a higher risk of being pushed aside by water pressure than sand or clay dikes. This
horizontal sliding is a rare type of failure mechanism. Though, when the stability of this dike is checked with a simple
one page computation, it becomes clear that the failure of the dike after a dry period was a realistic threat.
For many years it was known that this part of dike was at risk. This was reported to the minister of Public Works in
1993, but the two involved provincial authorities, the provincial government and the water board, did not take steps
until after the dike failure.
INTRODUCTION
In The Netherlands there is more than 17.000 km of
dikes. The Dutch are all familiar with the huge flood
disaster of February 1953, at the islands of the province
Zeeland (Sea land), in the Southwest of The
Netherlands, in which 1836 Dutch people died. The sea
dikes failed during a combination of high tide and a
heavy storm. Also the problems of the river dikes
during the high water situations in March 1988,
December 1993, and January-February 1995 are not
yet forgotten. So, the Dutch people expect a higher risk
of dike failure during storm, high tide or after a long
rain period sometimes combined with melting water
from the glaciers in the Alps.
Fig. 1. Canal (left) and dike(right)
Therefore the Dutch were very much surprised at
August 26th 2003, after the warmest and driest summer
in fifty years, that a dike along a canal failed.
Figure 1. shows the empty canal on the left and the
dike on the right. Figure 2. shows the dike after failure.
About 50 meter of dike was shifted towards the north
(left of the picture), leaving two breaches through
which the water from the canal streamed into a lower
quarter of the village Wilnis, 30 km Southeast of
Amsterdam.
Fig. 2. Shifted part of a canal dike
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PRIMARY AND SECONDARY DIKES IN THE
NETHERLANDS
The Netherlands is a country crossed by rivers and
surrounded in the North and West by sea. More than
50% of the country is below the high water level of the
rivers or sea. To prevent these areas from flooding,
dikes are build along the rivers and seas, with a total
length of about 3200 km. These dikes are called the
primary dikes.
A large part of these areas are even below average sea
level. Most of these areas are in the province Holland,
which is in the West of the country. For example the
area "Haarlemmer meer" (Harlem's Lake) was until
1852 the largest inner lake and is pumped dry in order
to create new land, up to 4.5 meters below sea level. In
this former lake, at 2 m below sea level, the
Amsterdam National Airport Schiphol is situated.
Nowadays about 100.000 people live in this former
lake.
The precipitation of the lower areas of the country
drains into the many ditches crossing these flat lands.
From the ditches the water is pumped up into canals
with water levels sometimes several meters higher than
the land. From these canals the water is pumped up
into the rivers, or in some rare occasions into the sea.
The water in the canals is stopped from flooding the
land by canal dikes, which are called the secondary
dikes. There is about 14000 km secondary dike in The
Netherlands.
The main differences between the primary and the
secondary dikes are:
• Primary dikes only seldom have a maximum load
(water level to the head of the dike), secondary
dikes have a constant maximum load.
• The water level of the primary dikes are driven by
nature (sea dikes: tide, storm and wind direction;
river dikes: precipitation and melting glaciers of
the Alps), the water level of the  secondary dikes
are controlled by man.
• The water level of the primary dikes are in most
cases much higher than of the secondary dikes.
This results in a higher damage at failure of
primary dikes.
• The primary dike are controlled by the state
government, the secondary by both a
democratically elected provincial water board and
a democratically elected provincial government.
• Per year € 10.000 per km primary dike is spend on
maintenance and € 2000 per km secondary dike.
SITUATION WILNIS
The village Wilnis is part of the community "Ronde
Venen" (Round Peats). It is about 30 km Southeast of
Amsterdam. There is a ring canal which goes from the
lake near Vinkeveen, through Wilnis, towards the city
Mijdrecht (Figure 3). The old part of Wilnis is South of
the ring canal. The new housing quarter, named
"Veenzijde" (Peat-side) is the square of land North of
the ring canal.
Fig. 3. Wilnis connected with the lake
Most of the soil in these areas are peat layers. In some
areas the peat has been excavated for heating houses.
This peat extracting took place from the middle ages
up to one century ago when coal was found in the
Southwest of the country, but mostly in the 17th and
18th century.
Fig. 4. Wilnis along the ring canal
In figure 4, a dot marks the location of the dike failure.
The new housing area Veenzijde is North of this dot
and is one of these excavated peat areas. The secondary
ring dike between Veenzijde and the canal is not like
most of the Dutch dikes man-made, but is a left-over
from the peat-excavation. The area south of the ring
canal is not excavated and is therefore as high as the
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failing ring dike on the other side. The ring dike is the
only barrier between 10 square km of water of the
"Vinkeveense plassen" (Finch-Peat's Lakes).
The complete dike consists of rather homogeneous
forest-peat. Below this forest-peat there is a layer of
swamp-peat, full of reed, leaves and roots. Below this
layer there is a thin fat-clay layer, which lays on a very
thick sand layer. Because of the soft subsoil, the houses
in the South are founded on wooden piles, the new
houses in the North on prefab concrete piles.
DIKE BREACH WILNIS
Fig. 5. Shifted part north-dike
In the night of Monday on Tuesday August 26th, at
1:30 h, about 50 m of the secondary dike along the ring
canal near Wilnis was translated sideways over 15 m.
Because of this, the water in the canal started to run,
along both ends of the shifted dike part, into the new
housing quarter Veenzijde.
Fig. 6. Circular slip surface failure of the south-quay
Fortunately, a local contractor immediately started to
close off both ends of the ring canal in the East and the
West and a side canal in the South. By the time the ring
canal was closed off with clay, which was immediately
brought by other contractors, the 600 houses in
Veenzijde were already half a meter under water. The
2000 residents were evacuated in the early morning.
Almost all residents could return to their homes the
same evening after the water was pumped out of this
area. Because of the failure of the north-dike, the water
level in the canal dropped instantly. Because of this the
supporting horizontal water pressure on the south-quay
disappeared, creating this quay to fail by a circular slip
surface, see figure 6.
FAILURE MECHANISM
The failure mechanism of the dike is a horizontal
pushing aside of the dike. The forces reacting on the
dike and sizes are more or less as shown in figure 5.
The stability of this dike can be checked easily with a
simple one page computation.
The specific weight of wet peat is rather low. Because
of the large amount of water (up to 80% or 90%!) and
organic mater (lighter than water!) the specific weight
is not more than γwet = 10 kN/m
3. When peat dries out
in a dry summer, the specific weight can drop easily to
γdry = 6 kN/m
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Fig. 7. Cross section and failure mechanism
In figure 7, the total cross section of the dike above the
horizontal slip surface is 299,85 m
tot
I = . The cross




I = , so the part of peat which is able to dry
out is: 299.85 81,6 18,25 mdry tot wetI I I= − = − = . The
vertical uplifting water pressure P is identical to the
weight of the wet part of the dike Gwet, since in this
case the specific weight of peat is the same as the
specific weight of water.
The driving horizontal force of the water pressure is:
1 2 2
2
10 (6,5 2,1) 0.7 94,35 kN/m
hor
F  = × × − − =  .
In the Dutch Standard for soil mechanics (code: NEN
6740, table 1) lower representative soil parameters are
given in case no soil investigation has been carried out.
For unloaded or non-pre-stressed peat a specific weight
of γwet = 10 kN/m
3 is given and a angle of internal
friction of ' 15φ = ° and a cohesion of c' = 2 kPa. (Since
the reed and leave parts lay flat (horizontally) in the
peat, the shear resistance is minimal in horizontal
direction.)
Suppose the dike is completely wet, which means also
the part above the freatic line (γ = 10 kN/m3). In this
case the maximum resistance force of the dike against
horizontal shear failure is:




2 32 0.268 18.25 10
112.90 kN/m
dry wetF c A Iφ γ= +
= × + × ×
=
This results in a stability factor during wet times of:
112,9 / 94,35 1.20f = =
However when the peat of the upper part has dried out
after a long hot summer, an average specific weight of




2 32 0.268 18.25 6
93,35 kN/m
dry dryF c A Iφ γ= +
= × + × ×
=
This results in a stability factor after a dry and hot
period of:
93.35/ 94,35 0.99f = =
which explains the failure of the dike of Wilnis.
Interesting is that in this case about 2/3 of the
maximum shear resistance is obtained from cohesion
( ' 2 32 64 kN/mc A = × = ) and not from friction. This
makes the dike in fact less sensible to mass reduction
caused by drying out. So, the drying out was more like
the last straw that broke the camels back. The safety of
the dike was already rather low.
Another interesting question is why the dryness did not
decrease the pore pressure and as a result increase the
effective stresses and strength near the slip surface?
There may be several reasons for this:
1) The slip surface is to deep for being influenced by
the dryness.
2) The horizontal permeability of the  forest-peat is
much higher than the vertical.
3) The permeability of the swamp-peat (near slip
surface) is higher then the forest-peat.
4) A combination of these three.
This question is still part of research.
RESPONSIBILITIES
Flooding can lead to huge financial damage in The
Netherlands. In order to prevent insurance companies
from getting bankrupted after a hug flood, the Dutch
government has accepted a law which forbids
insurance companies from insuring any damage caused
by flooding or dike failure. Another law has been
accepted which gives the state the option to pay a part
of the occurred damage, but this does not mean that the
victims have any rights to claim for money after a
flood disaster. In most cases, however, the government
pays a part of the damage. The only way for the
victims to get all the damage paid is to prove that some
party has been negligible in doing its duties. Therefore
knowing who is responsible, and for what part, is very
important for the victims.
In The Netherlands the primary dikes are the
responsibility of the state government by the ministry
of public works, who is in most cases also the owner of
the dike. The responsibility of the secondary dikes is
more complex. First of all the owner (private person,
company, city or province) is not responsible for dike
failure. The water boards should maintain the dikes
such that they remain in good shape. Upgrading of the
dikes to a higher safety level is, according to the water
board, more than maintenance so the water board will
only do this if provincial rules prove this is necessary.
The provinces are responsible for making rules to
which the dikes should satisfy, but they haven't made
any rules yet. This has led to a stalemate situation.
Since the provinces and water boards are both directly
elected, this situation can not easily be solved by state
regulations.
The state government is not allowed to intervene in this
provincial matter. One time however, the state
government has made an exception. In January 1960 a
canal dike failed near Amsterdam, leaving many
houses of a village flooded. Because of this the
governmental Technical Advisory board for Water
barriers (TAW) was erected in 1965 with the task to
determine which primary and secondary dikes were
unsafe. They reported to the minister of public works
firstly about the primary dikes and in 1993 finally
about the secondary dikes, saying:
"1730 km secondary dikes of the most important 200
polders have been surveyed. 323 km of dike was
unsafe. 167 km of dike has been improved already, 156
km of dike is still unsafe (date: January 1st, 1993)".
The dike of Wilnis was among these unsafe dikes. The
water board for Wilnis, named after three important
small rivers in this area "Amstel, Gooi and Vecht",
knows about this report but never decided to carry out
a stability analysis. In fact there are no provincial rules
which force the water board to do this. Although the
minister and the governmental TAW are not allowed to
have an opinion about this provincial situation, the
minister has asked in 1993 the provinces and water
boards to improve the unsafe dikes.
Therefore only the provincial government and the
water board can be held responsible for the dike failure
of Wilnis. The questions whether and which of these
two authorities are responsible are not easy to answer.
At least one point is clear. The dike failure is not a
geotechnical problem but a governmental management
problem.
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